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INTRODUCTION
In general, the situation in both South Africa and Zimbabwe is very 
different from the ‘Arab Spring’ model, where mass uprisings used social 
media as advocacy and organizing tools followed by states switching off the 
internet or blocking access to it via  mobile phones, as discussed in the 
chapter  by Nagla  Rizik.   It  is  also  quite  different  from the situation  in 
China, were the target is public use of online media.  In South Africa and  
Zimbabwe there are more incident-based instances of censorship, which 
pertain to specific media reports or information published online and to 
individual voices on social media platforms.  Both countries have constitu-
tional  protection  of  freedom  of  expression,  including  press  freedom. 
However, they both have legislation which has been used to secure the 
censorship of critical voices.  It is not possible in a chapter of this length 
and type to engage in full-scale analysis of all relevant legislation.  There-
fore, the chapter only provides a snapshot of some of the relevant legisla-
tion.  It aims to provide examples of the different types of censorship that  
have occurred in both countries in the last two years. 
State information in South Africa is currently protected by the Protec-
tion of Information Act 84 of 1982.  This Act will soon be repealed and re-
placed by the Protection of State Information Bill (B6D-2010), commonly 
known as the Secrecy Act.  At the time of writing (November 2013) the 
Secrecy Act has been passed by the Parliament but has been denied presid-
ential assent due to constitutional concerns.1  It is currently being recon-
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sidered by an Ad hoc Committee of Parliament.  Access to information is 
regulated by the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (here-
inafter, ‘PAIA’).  The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 
of 2002 (hereinafter, ‘ECTA’), which provides for internet service provider 
(ISP) liability, is also relevant to this discussion, and is the subject of an-
other chapter in this book, written by Andrew Rens.  Censorship is often 
closely linked to surveillance and interception of communications.  South 
Africa’s Regulation of the Interception of Communications Act 70 of 2002 
(hereinafter, ‘RICA’) is also directly relevant.  It is not discussed in this 
chapter  and  readers  are  referred  to  other  writings  on  the  topic. 2  This 
chapter will only focus on the provisions of the Secrecy Act. 
State information in Zimbabwe is protected by the Official Secrets Act,3 
and access to non-state information is regulated by the Access to Informa-
tion and Protection of Privacy Act.4  Like South Africa, Zimbabwe has le-
gislation regulating the interception of communication, namely the Inter-
ception of Communications Act.5  In addition, Zimbabwe’s Public Order 
and Security Act6 creates the criminal offence of insulting the president.7 
Similarly, the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act,8 creates the 
offence of undermining or insulting the President.   Zimbabwe has a new 
Constitution, adopted in the first quarter of 2013.  This will necessitate the 
evaluation and amendment of all of the above legislation to ensure that it 
complies with the new Constitution.  As will be shown below, some of 
these  provisions  have  already  been  struck  down  by  the  Constitutional 
Court. 
SOUTH AFRICA
Section 16 of South Africa's Constitution provides for the freedom of 
expression, which expressly includes 'the freedom of the press and other 
media'.9  It also lists the ‘right to receive or impart information or ideas'. 
Section 32 provides for the right to access state information as follows:
(1) Everyone has the right of access to —
(a) any information held by the state, and; 
(b) any information that is held by another person and that is required  
for the exercise or protection of any rights;
(2) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, and may provide  
for  reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on  
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the state.
These constitutional provisions have been further fleshed out by PAIA 
and its regulations over which the South African Human Rights Commis-
sion (SAHRC) has been given oversight.  The SAHRC's main role relates 
to monitoring the implementation of the Act and reporting on this annu-
ally to Parliament.  Whilst the legislation has been implemented to some 
extent, it has been pointed out that it has not been as successful as expec-
ted mainly due to limited public knowledge of the legislation which means 
that only a few requests for information have been filed.
South African media has used these provisions to obtain information 
on which they have reported, particularly in relation to state corruption, to 
the chagrin of the state.  In other instances, information forming the basis 
of such media reports has been provided by whistleblowers who work for, 
or with, the state.  The state's response has been varied.  This chapter fo-
cuses on its arguments that some of this information ought not to be dis-
closed as to do so would be detrimental to national security. 
Like its predecessor, the Secrecy Act will allow the state to cordon off 
certain information on the basis of state security.  The media and other 
stakeholders pushed back against the passage of the Secrecy Act arguing 
that it is nothing but an attempt to hide wrongdoing under the pretext of 
security concerns.10  The initial lack of any protection for whistleblowers 
was considered as a deliberate ploy to discourage whistleblowing.  Other 
arguments centred on the harshness of the penalties prescribed for convic-
tions on the offences created by the Act.  Despite such contestation, the 
(revised) Secrecy Act was passed by Parliament on 25 April 2013.  As noted 
above, the President declined to sign the bill and referred it back to Parlia-
ment in September 2013.  Under the Secrecy Act, certain state organs will 
be able to classify certain information as sensitive and thus put it beyond 
the reach of the media and any subsequent public scrutiny. 
It is against this background that we consider the role of the Internet 
and how the tensions between press freedom and the protection of state 
information are likely to be played out.  The major concern here is that, 
under the new regulatory regime created by the Secrecy Act, the media 
will be unable to report on significant issues.  This is because their posses-
sion of relevant information,11 their failure to surrender this information to 
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the  relevant authorities12 and any unlawful  an intentional  disclosure  or 
publication of this information will constitute criminal offences.13  Section 
41 provides for a public interest defence in the following terms: 
Any person who unlawfully and intentionally discloses or is in possession of classi -
fied state information in contravention of this Act is guilty of an offence and is li -
able to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, except where  
such disclosure or possession—
(a) is protected or authorised under the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000  
(Act No. 26 of 2000), the Companies Act, 2008 (Act No. 71 of 2008), the Preven-
tion and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act No. 12 of 2004), the Na-
tional Environmental Management Act, 1998 (Act No. 107 of 1998), or the Labour  
Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995);
(b) is authorised in terms of this Act or any other Act of Parliament; or
(c) reveals criminal activity, including any criminal activity in terms of  
section 45 of this Act.
A few observations about this section are necessary.  First, it is a revised 
version  of  the  defence that  was provided  for  in  earlier  versions  of  the 
Secrecy Bill, namely clause 43 of the Protection of State Information Bill 
6B of 2010/2011.  Clause 43 of Bill B6B read as follows:
Any person who unlawfully and intentionally discloses classified in-
formation in contravention of this Act is guilty of an offence and liable to a 
fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, except where 
such disclosure is —
(a) protected under the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000 (Act No. 26 of 2000) or sec-
tion 159 of the Companies Act, 2008 (Act No. 71 of 2008); or
(b) authorised by any other law.
Clause 43 was clearly narrower than the current s41 as it contained a 
shorter list of legislation in paragraph (a) and did not contain paragraph (c). 
It  was  criticized  for  not  incorporating  a  full  public  interest  defence.14 
Secondly,  section  41  of  the  Secrecy  Act  contains  limited whistleblower 
protection but does not provide for a full public interest defence as had 
been called for by numerous stakeholders.15 The defence is not a full de-
fence as it is limited to disclosures about criminal activity only.  It does not 
extend  to  improper  conduct  such  as  compromised  tender  processes. 
Thirdly, reliance on the section 41 defence requires that the person disclos-
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ing information must first ascertain that the information he wants to re-
port or disclose is protected by the specified legislation or actually relates 
to the commission of a criminal offence.  This necessitates reliance upon 
legal advice.  The process of obtaining such advice may take some time and 
thus delay the disclosure of certain information.  In some cases this may be 
detrimental to the public interest as the allegedly criminal activities will 
continue in the interim. 
South Africa has had its fair share of conflicts in relation to access to 
information.  One of the most well-known conflicts relates to the Arms 
Deal scandal that has been under public scrutiny since it  was signed in 
1999.  One of the key players in the matter, Richard Young, Managing Dir-
ector of  CCII Systems (Proprietary) Ltd. successfully applied to the High 
Court for state information to support his claims that CCII's bid to supply 
information management to support the Arms Deal.16  The fact that the 
state refused to give Young information on the basis of sensitivity until he 
obtained a High Court order may be seen as an example of the state with-
holding information. 
Another well-known case  is  that of  Project  Avani in which hoax e-
mails were allegedly sent by the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to dis-
credit some contestants in the presidential race.17  Another controversial 
issue that has been the subject of media scrutiny is the upgrades to the 
president’s rural homestead in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal.  Being a presid-
ential residence, this property is protected by the National Key Points Act 
102 of 1980 and the disclosure of certain information about it, may be an 
offence.18  It has been argued that had these events occurred after the en-
actment of the Secrecy Act, the media would not have been able to report 
on them without attracting criminal liability as they could have been clas-
sified.19  These matters were ultimately reported in the print media and the 
newspapers’  websites  or  electronic editions.   Therefore any attempts to 
censor the contents of print media inevitably extends to the internet as 
well.
Old  school  state  censorship  was  evident  in  the  arrest  of  a  Sunday 
Times Journalist, Mzilikazi wa Africa in 2010.  Whilst not expressly stated 
as the reason for his arrest, the arrest appears to have been linked to his re-
porting on alleged corrupt or criminal activities by the then Commissioner 
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of Police.20 The relevant newspaper reports were published in the print 
edition of the Sunday Times, and also on the newspaper’s website. 
Another  oft-cited  incident  of  censorship  is  that  of  Brett  Murray’s 
‘Spear of the Nation’ painting.21  This painting was exhibited at the Good-
man Gallery in Johannesburg in May 2013.  It depicted the President of 
South Africa in a Leninist pose with his genitals exposed.22  It was also 
published on the City Press newspaper’s website.  The exhibition and pub-
lication of the painting raised the issue of how to balance freedom of ex-
pression with the right to dignity, both of which are enshrined in the con-
stitution.  Was a demand to take down the picture an attempt to protect 
the President’s dignity or an unjustified act of censorship?  
A number of attempts were made to secure the removal from the paint-
ing from the Goodman Gallery.  These included the instigation of a de-
famation claim by the President and negotiations with the gallery by the 
ruling party on behalf of the President.  The Film and Publications Board 
classified the painting as pornography, which would have required its re-
moval.  However, this classification was later revoked.  The picture was ul-
timately removed from the gallery after it was vandalized by two men on 
the same day.  These men were arrested and, at the time of writing, are still  
being prosecuted for the crime of malicious damage to property.
The African National  Congress,  the President’s political  party,  led a 
boycott of the City Press and demonstrations against the newspaper after 
it refused to remove the painting from its website.  In the end, the editor of  
the newspaper apologized to the president’s family and removed the pic-
ture from the newspaper’s website.23  However, by that time the painting 
had been posted on Wikipedia and other websites and had already gone 
viral. 
A final example is the censorship of the First National Bank's  (FNB’s) 
‘You  can help’  online  advertising  campaign.   FNB’s  campaign  included 
statements by young South Africans criticizing the government was chal-
lenged as disrespectful political agitation by the ruling party and ultimately 
removed voluntarily from the bank’s  YouTube channel.24  In neither  of 
these incidents was there direct censorship by the state; in neither case  did 
the state remove the material from the internet through litigation or pro-
secution.   Rather,  after  robust national  debates  with strident  voices  on 
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both  sides  of  the  debate,  FNB  removed  the  videos  from  YouTube. 
However, this may be viewed as indirect state censorship in the sense that 
social pressure initiated primarily by the state ultimately led to self-censor-
ship. 
ZIMBABWE
In Zimbabwe threats of prosecution under various pieces of legislation 
have a chilling effect of freedom of expression and press freedom online. 
However, in March 2013 Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution.25 Section 
61 of the Constitution, 2013 provides for freedom of expression and free-
dom of the media,26 and section 62 provides for access to information.27 
These provisions are comprehensive and clear and should usher in a new 
era of freedom of expression, freedom of the media and access to state in-
formation.  As noted above, Zimbabwe’s existing legislation will have to be 
evaluated and amended if necessary to ensure compliance with these con-
stitutional provisions. 
Under the current legislative framework, there have been numerous re-
ports of instances of old school censorship.  For example, within two years 
of the enactment of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 
Act (AIPPA), it was reported that there had been more than a dozen in-
stances of arrest or other state harassment of journalists.28  These incidents 
affected the print and online publication of certain stories. 
Technical examination of the Internet infrastructure has shown that 
the state is not using any direct filtering of the Internet.29  However, there 
have been reports of email surveillance, the use of an e-mail filtering sys-
tem that blocks political content from reaching Reserve Bank employees 
and physical  raids of Internet cafés where suspected illegal  activity  was 
taking place.30  The suspected illegal activity was the dispatch of an email 
that was considered to be insulting to the President, which is criminalized 
by the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Criminal Law (Co-
dification and Reform) Act (CLCRA).  However, on October 30, 2013, the 
Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe struck down sections 31(a)(iii) and 33(a)
(ii) of the CLCRA which provided for the offences of ‘publishing or com-
municating false statements prejudicial to the State’ and ‘undermining the 
authority of, or insulting, the President’ respectively.31   
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In early June 2013, an individual began posting information about the 
allegedly corrupt activities of members of the ruling party in government 
on Facebook, under the pseudonym ‘Baba Jukwa’.32 This person claimed to 
be a disgruntled member of the ruling party who could no longer sit back 
and watch the wrongdoings in his party.  He thus took to exposing them 
online.  The ruling party’s initial response was to shrug off Baba Jukwa, 
saying that he was entitled to his opinion and had the freedom to share it,  
if he so wished.  This apparently noble stance was probably due to the fact 
that 2013 was an election year in Zimbabwe and it would not do for the rul-
ing party to be seen to be aggressively censoring critical voices.  However, 
appearances may be deceptive, and it seems that the police are trying to 
unmask Baba Jukwa,33 and some online attackers have ostensibly locked 
the e-mail address that Baba Jukwa was using.34  If these efforts are success-
ful, he may be prosecuted.
CONCLUSION
Both countries have similar legislative frameworks that enable censor-
ship to occur (see figure 1 below).  The main difference is that Zimbabwe 
has legislation criminalizing insults to the President — whilst South Africa 
does not.  However there have been calls for the introduction of such laws 
in South Africa.35
In  both  countries,  there  have  been  incidences  of  censorship  of  the 
press and individuals as recounted above.  In many instances the informa-
tion or views acted against are available in both print and online format. 
Action, though often primarily directed at the print or physical manifesta-
tion of  the  material,  inevitably  affects  the  Internet  as  well.   All  the  in-
stances outlined above have political overtones in that the newspaper or 
individual had expressed views that were considered to be critical of the 
sitting government.  This then led not only to direct state censorship, but 
state-encouraged and censorship or the exertion of socio-political and eco-
nomic pressure that led to the ‘voluntary’ removal of the material from the 
internet.  
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Figure 1: Relevant legislation in South Africa and Zimbabwe
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1 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Protection of State Information Bill: referral back by President 
(Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20131010-protection-state-information-bill-
referral-back-president> (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
2 Phillip De Wet and Alistair Fairweather Spying far worse in South Africa than the U.S., MAIL 
AND GUARDIAN (June 13, 2013), http://mg.co.za/article/2013-06-14-00-spying-far-worse-in-
south-africa.  See also, Lauren Hutton, Oh Big Brother, Where Art Thou? On the Internet, Of 
Course ... The Use of Intrusive Methods of Investigation by State Intelligence Services, 16 AFRICAN 
SECURITY REV. 111, and Caroline B. Ncube, Watching the Watcher: Recent Developments in Pri-
vacy Regulation and Cyber-Surveillance in South Africa, (2006) 3 SCRIPT-ED 344, available at 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol3-4/ncube.asp. 
3 Official Secrets Act of 1970, Chap. 11:09 (Zimbabwe).
4 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002, Chap. 10:27 (Zimbabwe).  For a 
brief historical overview, see Caroline B. Ncube, A Comparative Analysis of Zimbabwean and 
South African Data Protection Systems, J. INFO. L. & TECH. (2004), http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/
fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2004_2/ncube/.  For a detailed overview, see AFRICAN NETWORK OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWYERS, NATIONAL STUDY ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN ZIMBABWE 
(2012),  http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/publications/national-study-on-
access-to-information-in-zimbabwe-2012.
5 Chapter 20, 
6 Public Order and Security Act of 2003, Chap. 11:17, s.16(2)(b) (Zimbabwe).
7 See Caroline B. Ncube, The Dignity of the Office of the State President and the Freedom of 
Expression: Section 16(2)(b) of the Public Order and Security Act of 2003 (Zimbabwe), 2004 TURF L. 
REV. 12 (2004).
8 Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act of 2004, Chap. 9:23 (Zimbabwe).
9 Section 16 provides:
(1)  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes —
(a) freedom of the press and other media;
(b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;
(c) freedom of artistic creativity; and
(d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.
(2)  The right in subsection (1) does not extend to —
(a) propaganda for war;
(b) incitement of imminent violence; or
(c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and 
that constitutes incitement to cause harm. 
10 See Secrecy Bill, RIGHT2KNOW CAMPAIGN, http://www.r2k.org.za/secrecy-bill (providing de-
tails of the campaign mounted by the Right2Know against the Secrecy Bill).
11 Section 41, Protection of State Information Bill, 2013.
12 Section 42. 
13 Section 41. 
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14 See James Grant, Defences under the Protection of State Information Bill: Justifications and the 
Demands of Certainty, 28 SOUTH AFRICAN J. HUM. RTS. 328, 338 -339 (2012).
15 See, e.g., R2K to protest Secrecy Bill vote, RIGHT2KNOW (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.r2k.org.za/
2013/04/25/secercy_bill_vote_protest. 
16 CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd v. Fakie NO 2003 (2) SA 325 (T).  There was a related Supreme Court of 
Appeal decision that did not affect the High Court’s access to information ruling, Fakie v 
CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [2006] SCA 54. 
17 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE 
FINAL REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE LEGALITY OF THE 
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE NIA ON MR S MACOZOMA (2006),  
http://www.oigi.gov.za/Speeches/IG%20Exec%20Summary%2023%20Mar%2006.doc.
18 Pierre de Vos, Nkandla: The Details Will, and Should, Be Made Public, DAILY MAVERICK (May 
16, 2013), http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2013-05-16-nkandla-the-details-will-and-
should-be-made-public.
19 Ilham Rawoot, Secrecy Bill: the Stories that Couldn't be Told, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2011), 
http://mg.co.za/article/2011-09-09-secrecy-bill-the-stories-that-couldnt-be-told.
20 See Fienie Grobler, Media Feedom under Spotlight as Reporter Arrested, MAIL & GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 4, 2010), www.mg.co.za/article/2010-08-04-media-freedom-under-spotlight-as-reporter-
arrested; see also Sapa, Cops Admit Mzilikazi Wa Afrika Arrest Was Wrongful, THE TIMES (Nov. 
18, 2012), http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2012/11/18/cops-admit-mzilikazi-wa-afrika-arrest-
was-wrongful. 
21 See generally David Freedberg, Case of the Spear, 11 ART SOUTH AFRICA 36  (Sept. 2012), avail-
able at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/arthistory/faculty/Freedberg/Case-of-the-Spear.pdf. 
22 Matthew Burbidge, Gallery Refuses to Remove “Spear of the Nation” Artwork, MAIL & 
GUARDIAN (May 17, 2013), http://www.mg.co.za/2012-05-17-anc-irate-over-spear-of-the-
nation-artwork. 
23 Phillip de Wet, Boycott Fails, but City Press Agrees to Drop “The Spear”, MAIL & GUARDIAN 
(May 28, 2013), http://www.mg.co.za/article/2012-5-28-boycott-fails-but-city-press-agrees-to-
drop-the-spear.
24 Sizwe same Yende, FNB: Removal of Clips Doesn’t Censor Young Voices, CITY PRESS (Jan. 23, 
2013), http://www.citypress.co.za/politics/fnb-removal-of-clips-doesnt-censor-young-voices.
25 CONST. OF ZIMBABWE, available at http://www.copac.org.zw.
26 Section 61 states:
1.Every person has the right to freedom of expression, which includes:
a. freedom to seek, receive and communicate ideas and other information;
b. freedom of artistic expression and scientific research and creativity; and
c. academic freedom.
2. Every person is entitled to freedom of the media, which freedom includes protection of the confidentiality 
of journalists’ sources of information.
3.Broadcasting and other electronic media of communication have freedom of establishment, subject only 
to State licensing procedures that:
a. are necessary to regulate the airwaves and other forms of signal distribution; and
b. are independent of control by government or by political or commercial interests.
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4. All State-owned media of communication must:
a. be free to determine independently the editorial content of their broadcasts or other communica-
tions;
b. be impartial; and
c. afford fair opportunity for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions.
5. Freedom of expression and freedom of the media exclude:
a. incitement to violence;
b. advocacy of hatred or hate speech; or
c. malicious injury to a person’s reputation or dignity; or
d. malicious or unwarranted breach of a person's right to privacy.
27 Section 62 states:
1. Every Zimbabwean citizen or permanent resident, including juristic persons and the Zimbabwean me-
dia, has the right of access to any information held by the State or by any institution or agency of govern-
ment at every level, in so far as the information is required in the interests of public accountability.
2. Every person, including the Zimbabwean media, has the right of access to any information held by any 
person, including the State, in so far as the information is required for the exercise or protection of a right.
3. Every person has a right to the correction of information, or the deletion of untrue, erroneous or mislead-
ing information, which is held by the State or any institution or agency of the government at any level, and 
which relates to that person.
4. Legislation must be enacted to give effect to this right, but may restrict access to information in the in-
terests of defence, public security or professional confidentiality, to the extent that the restriction is fair, reas-
onable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equal-
ity and freedom.
28 Article 19 & MISA-Zimbabwe, THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND PROTECTION OF 
PRIVACY ACT: TWO YEARS ON (2004), http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/
zimbabwe-aippa-report.pdf.
29 OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN ZIMBABWE (2009), http://opennet.net/sites/
opennet.net/files/ONI_Zimbabwe_2009.pdf
30 Id.
31 Zvamaida Murwira, Concourt Strikes Down Sections of Statute Law, THE HERALD (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://www.herald.co.zw/concourt-strikes-down-sections-of-statute-law. 
32 See Wikipedia, Baba Jukwa, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Jukwa (as on Nov. 5, 2013, 
20:15).
33 Marry Anne Jolley, Mugabe Offers $300,000 for Outing of Anonymous Whistleblower Baba Jukwa, 
ABC NEWS (July 17, 2013), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-17/mugabe-offers-
243002c000-for-outing-of-anonymous-whistleblower/4824498
34 Adam Taylor, Has Baba Jukwa, Zimbabwe’s Infamous Anonymous Whistleblower, Really Been 
Caught?, WASHINGTON POST WORLDVIEWS BLOG (June 25, 2014), http://www.washington-
post.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/06/25/has-baba-jukwa-zimbabwes-infamous-anonym-
ous-whistleblower-really-been-caught/
35 Babalo Ndenze Call for Zuma Insult Law, IOL NEWS ( Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.iol.co.za/
news/politics/call-for-zuma-insult-law-1.1423784.
